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stitutes the typical organic process; reason and choice constitute the variant process in organic life. Instinct and reason "are but aspects of the basic tendency to "the persistence of life; they appear in opposition because we look only at complex organic forms, while the tendency to strive for persistence of life is fundamentally *elemental*, only secondarily relating to more or less integrated aggregates of elements, with which, in more or less complex organic form, biology has "to deal."

As to the formulation of the rule of conduct, which is in harmony with the psychological considerations advanced, it is maintained that "the important consideration in the guidance of our lives is attention to, and the strengthening of, "the more far-reaching and pervasive and persistent, although often less emphatic, "impulses within us; and that this is necessary if we are to become efficient individuals in the racial group to which we belong, and which we hope will persist "and develop in the future." The method of ensuring our conduct under this rule is "by the restraint of those instincts which are wont to be stimulated to vigorous and immediate reaction, by the restraint of the variations which are determined by rationalistic emphasis, until such time as those more pervasive instincts "that are not wont to be stimulated to vigorous and immediate reaction have time "to assert themselves and to gain due prominence in the determination of our action. . . . So soon as this habit of restraint in this manner becomes instinctive, "then, as we have argued above, we find ourselves governed by the religious instinct within us, then we find our trends of action determined not only by the "simple conscience which balances particular impulses, but by that wider development of conscience which teaches us to emphasise habitually the most permanent "order of impulse-efficiencies of which we can conceive; then, in other words, we "find ourselves guided by the 'sense of duty.'" Accordingly, the rule of action which best satisfies conscience and produces the closest correspondence between our actions as viewed in retrospect, and our most permanently efficient impulse-series, is formulated as follows: "Act to restrain the impulses which demand immediate reaction, in order that the impulse order determined by the existence of impulses of less strength, but of wider significance, may have full weight in the guidance of your life." "In other words"—and this sentence, heavily capitalised, concludes the work—"BE RELIGIOUS."

THE GROUNDWORK OF SCIENCE. A Study of Epistemology. By *St. George Mivart*. M. D., Ph. D., F. R. S. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. London: Bliss, Sands & Co. 1898. Pages, xvii, 328. Price, $1.75.

The announcement of a book on the groundwork of science by a natural inquirer of the standing of St. George Mivart, is well calculated to arouse the expectancy of students of epistemology; but it can scarcely be said that the hopes which would naturally be associated with such a publication have been realised. Instead of an investigation of the principles and methods which form the real difficulties of the subject, we are confronted with little more than a bare recital of the banal theories of the traditional philosophical moralising. It is remarked, for example, as a result of one special inquiry, that the groundwork of science must be sought in the human mind (as if any one could imagine it to be elsewhere), and that the objects of science are threefold: mental, physical, and metaphysical. The work abounds with like trivial conclusions and commonplaces. In the chapter on the methods of science the assumptions implied in scientific research are said to be as follows: (1) That certain knowledge is possible; (2) that an external objective world exists; (3) that we can know not only our actions, sensations, etc., but also our substantial and continuous personal existence; (4) that if certain premisses be true, whatever follows from them logically must be also true; (5) since we know certain truths indirectly by inference we must also know some things indirectly, and see that they are self-evident; (6) that nothing can at the same time both be and not be; (7) that some axioms are self-evident; (8) that every change must be due to some cause; (9) that nature is uniform; and (10) that some things are necessary, others are contingent. To the person who has given the least thought to that department of philosophy which is called the theory of knowledge, it must appear that it is precisely these so-called assumptions that require elucidation, and that it is nothing less than the object of epistemology to elucidate them. The thinking world is pretty clear as to the implications of the scientific method generally, and it is rather as to the justification and establishment of these implications that they are seeking light. The same remark applies to the crowning conclusions of Dr. Mivart's researches, viz., that the "groundwork of science" will be found to consist of three divisions: the laborers who work, the tools they must employ, and that which constitutes the field of their labor. There is scarcely any one who will deny the truth of this statement, and it would hardly seem that a work of over three hundred pages should be required to demonstrate it.

We should be far from saying that Dr. Mivart has not written a readable book and that there are not many valuable pages of descriptive matter and of general considerations touching the external mechanism of scientific method. All these things it is well to have, and their worth is enhanced by the fact that they come from a scientist who is a professing Roman Catholic, and that we may here see to what length it is permissible to carry the conclusions of reason within the fold of the Roman Church.

The titles of the main chapters of the book are: An Enumeration of the Sciences, The Objects of Science, The Methods of Science, The Physical Antecedents of Science, The Psychical Antecedents of Science, Language and Science, Intellectual Antecedents of Science, Causes of Scientific Knowledge, and The Nature of the Groundwork of Science.

It remains for us merely to quote the concluding remarks of the author: "We "feel bound to confess that the more we study nature, the more profoundly con"vinced do we become that the action of an all-pervading but unimaginable intel-

"ligence alone affords us any satisfactory conception of the universe, as a whole, "or of any single portion of the cosmos which may be selected for exclusive study.

"Unless we are profoundly mistaken, it is only through the conception of such "an energy, as an active causative principle, underlying and pervading the material cosmos, together with the recognition of the dignity of human reason, empowered as it is to perceive self-evident, universal, and objective truths, that we "can understand the groundwork of science and attain to a final and satisfactory "Epistemology." μκρκ.

L'ESIGLIO DI S. AGOOTINO. Note sulle contraddizioni di un Sistema di Filosofia per Decreto. By *Lorenzo Michelangelo Billia.* Turin: Fratelli Bocca. 1899. Octavo, pages, xi+148. Price, L. 3.

This book was occasioned by Professor De Craene's volume on *De la spiritualité de l'âme.* It is a metaphysical discussion of various questions relating to the philosophy of the Thomist school and of materialism. While not polemical, the book defends philosophic idealism. The supreme thought of the author is the Christian philosophy. The more philosophy becomes Christian, he says, the more it is philosophy, and Christianity is more philosophic the more it is sincere and entire. The author deprecates the present condition of the school in regard to the teaching of religion. Those who would take God from the school, he declares, are enemies of the human race. Religion is not a complement of education, a part of it, like other branches of learning, it is education itself. There is no true education that is not religious. Such is the conclusion of the author after a series of metaphysical discussions which take the reader back among the scholastics and leave him there.

THE DYNAMICS OF MIND. By *Rajkumar Banerji, M. A.* Part the First. Calcutta: Mitter Brothers. Bhowanipur. 1899. Pages, 46. Price, 1s. 6d.

Rajkumar Banerji, an Indian savant, publishes in the Indian Philosophical Series, No. 1, which is just out, a thoughtful monograph on *The Dynamics of the Mind.* It is based on the proposition that "mind is motion," and tries to explain mental activity from the laws of motion. It cleverly introduces modern theories of elasticity, postulates a thought-field analogous to the magnetic field, and also speaks of thought-induction, the transmission of thought-waves, convertibility of thought-waves, etc., etc. Sir William Crooke's ideas and also Thomson and Tait's theories are utilised in the interest of a mechanical explanation of thought transference.

As to the value of these speculations, we have to say that they are more ingenious than verifiable. They collide with the main facts as to the nature of the soul, which does not consist of motion but is the significance of a certain form of motion. The nature of mind does not consist in thought waves which can be treated like electric waves, but in the representativeness of certain feelings. Thus, it is obvious that the treatise of Rajkumar Banerji is based on premisses, which, accord-